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Summary 
It has been ten years since the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously 
acknowledged a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the shared responsibility of all nations and 
the international community to protect all people. Through this, the controversial debate on 
humanitarian intervention was to be replaced by a consensus that the protection of the 
populace from extreme atrocities is an integral component of and prerequisite for national 
sovereignty. But is the R2P actually being acknowledged and how has it developed in the ten 
years since its adoption? This PRIF Report shows how the disagreements among the nations 
regarding the significance and application of the set of moral norms contained in the R2P is 
precisely what has kept it alive and evolving: The components of prevention and 
international support have achieved broad acceptance, whereas at the same time, the aspect 
of international intervention in the case of atrocities continues to be highly controversial. 
However, the strong disagreements had the constructive effect of setting in motion reform 
and regional implementation initiatives, without which the R2P would probably be 
experiencing less acceptance today. 
The R2P is a set of norms that specify a number of behavioral expectations from states 
and international organizations. First, the responsibility norm, i.e., the expectation that 
individual states will protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing (first pillar); second, the support norm, i.e., the expectation 
that, upon request, the international community will support individual states in fulfilling 
their responsibilities (second pillar); third, the reaction norm, i.e., the expectation that, in 
the event of the failure or unwillingness of a government, the international community will 
react swiftly and decisively (third pillar). As a resolution of the General Assembly, the R2P 
does not create any new norms in international law, but is a formulation of moral norms 
instead. 
In order to analyze the degree of acceptance and level of controversy in connection with 
these norms, the present report examines the debate on R2P, its application in crisis 
situations and signs of its institutionalization. It is becoming apparent that, as a whole, the 
set of norms centering on R2P is gaining moderate acceptance in the community of states. 
The R2P receives increasing acknowledgment in global policy debates within the 
community of states, but with many states having reservations. It is true that systematic 
marketing of R2P by non-governmental organizations, dedicated individuals, diplomats 
from various states and the Secretariat of the United Nations have made possible the 
relatively rapid development of the R2P from an idea to a set of norms becoming more and 
more firmly embedded in the UN context. In media and PR work, at events held by R2P 
supporters, as well as in many scholarly publications, however, the level of support for R2P 
in member states is sometimes deliberately exaggerated in order to increase social pressure 
on the states and the Security Council to observe R2P. Many states in fact have misgivings 
about the norm for reacting to mass atrocities as set out by R2P and are drawing attention 
to possible misuse by great powers. How prevention of and reactions to specific atrocities 
are to be implemented is highly contentious. The limitation of national sovereignty is still a 
hotly disputed topic for states from the global South. Especially in cases in which it came to 
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an international intervention without the agreement of the local government, many states 
are expressing mistrust of the motives of the intervening states. Changes of regime imposed 
by force, such as in Libya in 2011, are not achieving any acceptance. The Security Council is 
applying the R2P selectively, even though confirmatory references to the responsibility to 
protect are to be found more and more frequently in Security Council resolutions – already 
38 times since 2005. But most of these references are not based on the entire set of norms 
included in R2P, only on the responsibility of the individual state involved. This is 
connected to the controversial nature of the third pillar, i.e., the question of the appropriate 
response to atrocities. Developing and emerging nations prefer peaceful forms of reaction 
and see dialogue as the best form of conflict resolution, whereas some Western nations 
frequently insist on giving a UN Peacekeeping operation responsibility for protecting the 
civil populace or even wish to use force themselves, as in Libya or Ivory Coast. In extreme 
cases, however, according to the demands of many developing and emerging nations, it is 
precisely the implementation of violent measures authorized by the Security Council which 
needs to be more closely supervised in order to avoid disproportionate intervention in the 
internal affairs of the target nation. Despite these conflicts, the institutionalization of R2P is 
progressing and the disagreements are being kept within limits. In the United Nations the 
R2P is institutionally established in the form of the offices of two special advisers for the 
prevention of genocide and the R2P, in the annual interactive dialogue of the General 
Assembly on the R2P, and through the Human Rights Up Front action plan. The level of 
regional and national anchoring of the norm is very uneven, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. But institutionalization is also progressing here through the creation of the 
R2P or genocide prevention focal points, as well as in the framework of intergovernmental 
preventive networks such as the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity 
Prevention or the Global Action against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC). 
In this analysis it will become apparent that the controversial aspects of the R2P are 
mainly focused on questions of appropriate application and implementation. The general 
validity of the responsibilities it contains is not openly questioned: Most nations have 
acknowledged that the protection of their population from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing is a prerequisite for the legitimate exercise of 
sovereignty. There is also basic agreement that in extreme cases the international 
community has a responsibility to intervene. However, because the thresholds for exercising 
this responsibility are interpreted differently, the reactive component of the R2P is hardly 
applied, although this third pillar of the R2P is not restricted to the application of armed 
force, which, according to the R2P, can only be considered in extreme cases and where there 
are good prospects of success. Both the imposition of sanctions and action through the 
International Criminal Court are also highly controversial. This can be seen, for instance, in 
the example of the civil war in Syria. However, as long as the intense disputes over 
implementation of the norm lead to initiatives for its further development, there does not 
seem to be any danger of R2P deteriorating to a meaningless level. The disagreement 
regarding NATO exceeding its mandate in the 2011 Libya intervention led Brazil to develop 
the idea of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) and China to develop the “responsible 
protection” concept. Both call for greater transparency and accountability of those 
intervening based on authorization from the Security Council. Given that the Security 
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Council is deadlocked over the Syria conflict, various initiatives for limiting the veto power 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council have gained a new lease on life. 
Finally, in the debate on the appropriate reaction to serious atrocities, a few smaller 
countries and NGOs reacted to the intransigent fronts with new initiatives on prevention 
such as the networks mentioned above. However, the norm could encounter difficulty 
because a) the reactive component is seldom applied and b) a few of the initiatives 
mentioned are now making no or few references to the concept of R2P and are 
concentrating instead on the prevention of genocide and atrocities. If the concept of R2P 
should, as a result, vanish from the discourse, this would weaken the norm: Prevention is a 
key focus of R2P. However, the norm also encompasses the equally important aspect of a 
peaceful or, if required, coercive reaction to atrocities. 
Against this background, at the international level several avenues open up for further 
development of the responsibility to protect norm. In the area of early warning and the 
concrete implementation of the prevention of atrocities, both the United Nations and the 
cooperating civil society actors should continue to be supported. At the same time, 
primarily Western states most strongly advocating the protection regime should set a good 
example and at both the national and international level institutionalize mechanisms aimed 
at reducing the danger of atrocities. In addition, the misgivings of many states of the South 
should be dealt with through institutional reforms. The “responsibility while protecting” 
idea proposed by Brazil offers a good starting point and could be translated into a proposal 
for reform of the working methods of the Security Council. In every sense, dialogue must be 
sought with skeptics who frequently regard the R2P agenda as an imposition of Western 
values on them. Consequently, in its marketing of the norm, civil society should also take 
greater consideration of the fears of the skeptics, instead of giving the impression that R2P is 
already firmly anchored internationally, regardless of what skeptics think about it. After all, 
it should not be forgotten that the majority of nations have never stated their position on 
R2P. Thus, as a final point, R2P should be officially added to the agenda of the General 
Assembly in order to initiate a dialogue between those in favor and those skeptical of the 
responsibility to protect. The goal of these efforts must be to establish an international 
consensus on the entire set of norms and thus also on the third pillar of R2P. To avoid 
discussing the issue of how to respond, including the use of military means, would 
contradict one of the core principles of the R2P, the right of the victims of the most serious 
violations of human rights to protection from serious atrocities. 
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1. Introduction 
Almost ten years have passed since representatives of all states, including about 150 heads of 
state and of government, unanimously acknowledged in September 2005 that they have a 
responsibility to protect their populations. Every state must protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If a state fails to do so, 
the international community should be ready to react through the UN Security Council. 
How has the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) developed in the ten years since it was 
adopted?1 Do the states support it? A review of news reports suggests that it has had an only 
limited effect so far. The Security Council does not seem to be capable of agreeing on a joint 
procedure in Syria, although people are being massacred there by their own government 
and Islamic terrorists. In the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Libya, Darfur, 
Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, noncombatants are being attacked by 
parties to the conflict, sometimes deliberately. In Myanmar the government is being 
accused of implementing a policy of ethnic cleansing against the minority Muslim Rohingya 
people. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is accused of serious crimes against 
humanity. And the international community is only demonstrating a willingness to react to 
such events in isolated cases. In February 2015, Amnesty International condemned the 
international reaction to serious atrocities as “shameful and ineffective” (Amnesty 
International 2015). However, on paper, the community of states is very active; at least as 
far as protection of civilians using armed forces is concerned. Blue Helmet soldiers in South 
Sudan are attempting to protect internally displaced persons on their bases from attacks by 
the parties to the conflict. African, French and other European soldiers have the task of 
protecting people in CAR from the threat of genocide. In 2011, regardless of the subsequent 
criticism of the implementation of the mandate, the Security Council authorized 
international intervention in the Libyan civil war in order to protect the civilian population 
from attacks by the Gaddafi regime. At almost the same time, French troops intervened in 
Ivory Coast to support the Blue Helmets there in protecting the population from the effects 
of the power struggle between the outgoing and newly elected presidents. Simultaneously, 
for several years, initiatives have increasingly been developing for the prevention of such 
atrocities by means of early warning and the creation of problem awareness among national 
decision makers. 
In Summer 2015, the Secretariat of the United Nations used the approaching tenth 
anniversary of the adoption of the R2P – also the 70th anniversary of the United Nations 
(UN) – as an opportunity to take stock of the advancement of R2P (Ban 2015) Ban Ki-
moon articulated six core priorities to inform atrocity prevention and response in the next 
ten years (Ban 2015: 15–19): The UN, regional organizations and states should demonstrate 
more political commitment, provide actual protection to communities at risk and pursue 
atrocity prevention and response as national priorities. Second, additional resources should 
 
 
1  This report was prepared as part of the project “Conditions for successful governance in the conflict 
between humanitarianism and sovereignty” supported by the German Research Foundation. I am grateful 
to Caroline Fehl, Matthias Dembinski, Bernhard Moltmann, Max Lesch and the Research Council of 
PRIF for helpful comments and critique. 
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be invested in atrocity prevention, early warning, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, 
protection of civilians, empowerment of women, and criminal justice. Third, the Security 
Council should ensure timely and decisive responses in cases of mass atrocities. Fourth, 
repeated cycles of violence should be interrupted by means of peacebuilding, good 
governance, transitional justice and societal reconciliation. Fifth, regional organizations 
should play a vital role in implementing R2P. Sixth, peer networks between state officials, 
UN staff and NGOs should be strengthened. States should develop national R2P strategies. 
During an informal debate on the report in the UN General Assembly in September 2015, 
many states reaffirmed the relevance of and the progress made in advancing R2P as a 
principle guiding international atrocity prevention and response policies (GCR2P 2015b). 
However, the increasing but still low degree of institutionalization of R2P and atrocity 
prevention on the regional and national level and the fact that the UN Security Council is 
increasingly deadlocked due to Great Power rivalries are, among other things, still 
challenges to R2P as a norm set. 
This report sheds light on all these aspects of R2P and provides an overview of the range 
of relevant actors and initiatives working internationally on R2P. However, the overall focus 
of this report is on the debate on the responsibility to protect and its components in the 
context of the UN, and especially on the recognition of and the disagreements over it 
among states. After all, the protection of people in situations of crisis will only be improved 
if the underlying principles of the R2P are accepted by the international community.2 The 
central thesis of this report is that the R2P has been kept alive and evolving by precisely the 
disagreements among the states regarding the norms entailed and their application: The 
norms of prevention and international support are being accorded more and more 
widespread acceptance. The norm of responsibility for an international response to 
atrocities remains in dispute. But these disagreements have themselves set in motion reform 
and regional atrocity prevention initiatives, without which the R2P would probably be 
enjoying less acceptance today.3  
The next section focuses on criteria for analyzing norm acceptance and dispute, followed 
by analysis of R2P’s development, the discourse on R2P, its application in crisis situations 
and its institutionalization at regional and international levels. In closing, possibilities for 
further development of the R2P norm set will be presented. 
 
 
2  The effects and conditions for the success of military humanitarian interventions are the subject of a 
research project currently being conducted by the PRIF (Gromes/Dembinski 2013). These points will only 
be touched upon briefly in this report. 
3  This report makes use of data from confidential interviews carried out with diplomats and officials of the 
UN Secretariat and NGOs in New York between August and October 2014. I wish to thank the German 
Academic Exchange Service for supporting the research visit and the Ralph Bunche Institute for 
International Studies in New York for their hospitality. 
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2. Norm acceptance and controversy 
How can we measure the influence of a norm? Considering its voluntary adoption by the 
addressees and examining cases when implementation was enforced when the norm was 
violated, for example by imposing sanctions or using force, is an obvious way to gauge its 
influence. But focusing only on the effects of a norm and sanctions mechanisms for 
inducing compliance does not go far enough. Norms in international relations specify 
general expectations of the behavior of the actors involved or, more precisely, “a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 891). They 
do not necessarily have to be but may be of a legal nature and often lack automatic 
sanctions mechanisms as we know them at the national level: If a serious crime is 
committed in Germany, the police services are required to make inquiries and commence 
an investigation. If a suspect is identified, a court is required to hand down a verdict and, in 
case of a conviction, to impose a sentence. It is different at the international level: Even in 
the case of clear breaches of international law, decisions on pursuing the matter are mostly 
political, not legal. Although, with the International Criminal Court (ICC), an independent 
body for investigating and punishing the most serious crimes exists, not all states accept its 
jurisdiction (see: Fehl 2014). In addition, the ICC cannot directly order protection against 
violence of the people in dire circumstances or arrest those responsible. The Security 
Council of the UN continues to be the highest ranking decision-making body on matters of 
global security. But this consists of representatives of states, not independent lawyers. 
Diplomats owe allegiance, above all, to the interests of their particular governments and less 
to maintaining the integrity of international law. Is everything thus only power politics? No. 
Research shows: Norms influence state behavior. They contain a moral obligation about 
what appropriate behavior by a state has to look like – at least for as long as they are 
accepted by a critical mass of states. The fact that violating a norm does not necessarily 
question its validity follows from this. Norms derive their legitimacy from their recognition 
by states. That a norm continues to be valid despite the rules being broken can be seen from 
the justification of breaking the rules by the norm-breaking party and the criticism of other 
states (Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 4; Sandholtz 2008: 14–15).  
Consequently, the first key indicator of – national and international – acceptance of a 
norm is its being referred to in political debate (Cortell/Davis 2000: 70–71). If many and 
also important actors make reference to a norm in a positive manner, it acquires a certain 
validity. In addition, the significance of a norm can be seen in its use as a rule for political 
behavior in a state, as well as in its being embedded in institutions, laws and procedures 
(Cortell/Davis 2000: 70–71). For the present analysis, this means: A norm counts as 
accepted, if it a) is salient in the discourse, b) is also specifically applied – which, at the 
international level, would mean that reference is made to the norm in dealing with conflicts, 
e.g. in the Security Council – and c) the norm is institutionally embedded in international 
organizations. 
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Figure 1: Indicators of norm acceptance 
  Degree of acceptance of a norm 
  High Moderate Low None 
Indicators 
Salience of the 
norm in the 
discourse 
Affirmative  
references 
Acceptance, with 
exceptions, special 
conditions and 
reservations 
Partial acceptance, but 
also rejection under 
reference to other norms 
Rejection or only used to 
legitimize other goals. 
No criticism of 
violations. 
Application 
of the norm 
Consistent  
application  
Application in individual 
cases  None  None  
Change in 
institutions 
Embedded within 
institutions 
Beginning to be embedded 
within institutions 
No 
institutional changes 
No 
institutional changes 
 
But at the same time the development of international systems of regulation is marked by 
ongoing contestation of norms and their application (Sandholtz 2009: 10–18; Wiener 2008). 
Disagreements on the correct interpretation of a norm and the behavioral expectations 
arising from it should not be ignored. The various actors make use of their own specific 
cultural background knowledge – domestic and regional social norms and practices, values 
and notions of justice – to assess the legitimacy of a norm (Acharya 2004; Wiener 2008; 
Müller 2013). Because controversy is a discursive phenomenon, disagreement about a norm 
can mainly be investigated through debates on the norm and its application.  
Contestation takes on different forms (see Wiener 2008; Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013): 
If the validity of a norm is disputed, it can be anticipated that the norm will be questioned 
by a critical mass of states. A third of the international community, including influential 
actors such as great powers, emerging powers or major regional organizations, is regarded 
as defining a critical mass (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 901–902; Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 
2013: 7). If the significance of a norm or its interpretation is disputed, it can be expected that 
various states, including influential actors, will propose differing interpretations of its 
contents. On the other hand, if there is controversy on the applicability and range of a norm, 
there will be disagreement on whether it can be applied in a specific situation and whether 
there has been any violation of the rules at all. Finally, the implementation of a norm can 
lead to disagreement. This occurs when differing understandings of the “appropriate” 
application of a norm in a particular situation exist, for example the extent to which the 
means being employed to sanction a violation are appropriate. 
The last two kinds of contestation can lead to more clarity in the specification of a norm 
or of the instruments employed to see that it is adhered to, and can thus even strengthen the 
norm (Badescu/Weiss 2010; Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013). Disputes about the significance 
of a norm can also lead to its being strengthened if a shared interpretation of the norm 
develops among the actors as a result (Wiener 2008). However, the stability of a norm “is 
eroding if non-compliance is no longer described as non-compliance and becomes wide-
spread”; this is most likely “when contestation radicalizes by (1) turning from application to 
validity itself (questioning the ‘righteousness’ of the obligatory claims as such) and by (2) 
becoming constant (allowing no more temporal stabilizations of the norm)” (Deitelhoff/ 
Zimmermann 2013: 5).  
In the following section I will describe the process of R2P’s evolution, thereby tracing 
how later conflicts loomed from the very beginning. Following this, using the indicators of 
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the acceptance and contestation regarding the norms presented here as a guideline, I 
investigate the complex development of R2P and its components. 
3. The emergence of R2P 
The Responsibility to Protect is part of a global, informal protection regime, which began to 
develop in the early 1990s. Emerging from the lessons and failures of the Blue Helmet 
missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, the practice of charging the peacekeeping 
missions of the United Nations with protecting civilians in armed conflicts had already 
begun to establish itself by 1999 (see for example: Peou 2002).4 At the same time, the 
controversy over humanitarian intervention and the NATO intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict in 1999, which did not have a UN mandate, led to the emergence of the set of 
norms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (on the emergence of the concept, see: Brock 
2013; Loges 2013). At that time, the debate was marked by the tension between the rights of 
states to sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs on the one hand and 
humanitarian international law and human rights on the other: Can people also be 
protected in internal conflicts and, if necessary, even against the will of the government in 
power? What happens when the Security Council cannot agree on invoking the collective 
security mechanism? For many developing and emerging nations, the non-intervention 
norm is a moral imperative in the debate, not just a legal impediment which the West can 
ignore whenever it deems this suitable (Thakur 2006: 279). Against the background of 
colonialism, they see their right to self-determination and equality as threatened by demands 
for the legal and moral admissibility of humanitarian interventions (Thakur 2006: 266).  
Following the controversial Kosovo intervention by NATO and the sovereignty debate 
introduced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Canada formed a group of experts. This 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was charged with 
unifying the varying perspectives on sovereignty and the protection of human rights. In the 
years 2000 and 2001, they worked out the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. The 
closing report of the ICISS, which had the same name, identified three interlinked national 
and international areas of responsibility in connection with the protection of the civilian 
population from  atrocities – prevention, reaction and reconstruction (ICISS 2001: XI). It 
formulated a duty of the international community to intervene in cases of mass murder if a 
state cannot protect its own civilian population or refuses to do so. The ICISS report also 
specified a set of criteria which should guide decision-making on the use of military force in 
emergencies. In this way, the debate was to be moved away from a right to humanitarian 
intervention and more strongly toward a duty to prevent atrocities arising from the right to 
 
 
4  The non-intervention requirement is the starting point for the UN’s collective security system. However, 
according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, if the Security Council identifies a threat to international peace 
or security, based on Chapter VII of the Charter it can impose preventive measures, economic pressure or 
even the use of military means. Whereas, earlier, Peacekeeping operations often operated under Chapter 
VI and, consequently, were not permitted to interfere in internal affairs, today many UN missions operate 
under Chapter VII mandates: Only with such a mandate can they carry out their supervisory function and 
protect civilians from violence. 
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exercise sovereign power. Sovereignty rights would not be restricted, but rather, the states 
would be encouraged to strengthen their sovereignty by fulfilling their responsibility to 
protect their civilian population.5 
However, the war against terror following September 11, 2001, as well as the Iraq War of 
2003, which was against international law, had negative consequences for the reception of 
the ICISS Report among those who saw liberal and humanitarian norms as a backdoor for 
great-power interventionism. Kofi Annan used this deadlocked situation for a reform 
initiative. A summit of heads of state and government on the implementation of the 2000 
Millennium Development Goals had already been scheduled to take place in 2005. Annan 
added UN reform to the agenda of this summit and thus also added peace and security 
topics. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to threats to international 
security he established in September 2003 supported “the emerging norm of a collective 
international responsibility to protect” (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change 2004: para. 202).6 Kofi Annan included almost all recommendations made by the 
panel in his report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all” published in March 2005 in preparation for the world summit (Annan 2005). 
Finally, after intensive debate (see Hofmann/Wisotzki 2014; Bellamy 2009: 66–91), the 
R2P became part of the summit outcome document (Resolution 60/1: paras. 138–40). Many 
states defended their right to equal sovereignty under the banner of the norm of non-
interference and reported misgivings over potential misuse of R2P. The compromise 
achieved leaves responsibility largely in the hands of the individual state, limits application 
of R2P to potential cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, and in extreme cases requires a decision by the Security Council approving 
international interference. 
With the resolution adopting the R2P, the informal humanitarian protection regime was 
specified by the norms which were later labeled the three pillars of the R2P by UN General 
Secretary Ban Ki-moon (Ban 2009). As a resolution of the General Assembly, it did not 
involve new international law norms, but rather a formulation of moral norms. Thus the 
R2P is a set of behavioral expectations directed at states. It includes, firstly, the norm of 
responsibility, the expectation that the individual state will protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (first pillar). This can 
be regarded as a norm in the sense of international law: an almost universally acknowledged 
basis in international law is provided by the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and their additional protocols, the Torture Convention, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Refugees Convention, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Arms Trade Treaty. Secondly, R2P 
contains the support norm, an expectation that, when requested to do so, the international 
 
 
5  At the same time as the ICISS process, a broader development was already taking hold in Africa: In view 
of the serious atrocities, the African Union (AU) had already incorporated in its constitutive act, adopted 
in 2000, a right of the AU to intervene (Dembinski/Reinold 2011: 8–10). 
6  One of the members of the High-level Panel, Gareth Evans, was an ICISS member. Canada also attempted 
– ultimately successfully – to persuade the entire group of experts to include the R2P in its recommendations 
(Bellamy 2009: 75f). 
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community will support individual states in fulfilling their responsibility (second pillar). 
Thirdly, it involves the response norm, the expectation that, in cases of failure or 
unwillingness of a government to do so, the international community will react quickly and 
decisively (third pillar). In addition, with the support of the Special Advisor on Prevention 
of Genocide, the early warning function of the UN is recognized. 
4. Acceptance and controversy: UN debates on R2P 
In January 2006 in Resolution 1653 on Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
for the first time, the Security Council referred to the primary responsibility of governments 
in the region to protect their populations. Confirmation of all the components of R2P in the 
2005 World Summit resolution proved to be more difficult. A British draft resolution on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts had already been discussed in a public session in 
December 2005. However, Russia, China and Algeria had rejected the adoption of the 
concept of “collective responsibility” (Lederer 2006) and, together with Algeria, the 
Philippines and Brazil, argued that the world summit document only required further 
discussion of the R2P (Bellamy 2010: 145). After the non-permanent membership of Algeria 
and Brazil expired at the end of 2005, Great Britain and its supporters succeeded in con-
vincing Russia and China to confirm the R2P in April 2006 in Resolution 1674 on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts (Lederer 2006). In the following years, the Security 
Council only referred to R2P once in a concrete case of conflict: Resolution 1706 (2006) on 
the situation in Darfur referred to the responsibility of the Sudan government to protect its 
population. There was no further reference to the R2P until the thematic Resolution 1894 in 
2009 (see also Section 5.3). 
Intervening years were marked by conflicts on the breadth of the responsibility to 
protect and its application to specific cases. After Darfur, the first case discussed with 
reference to the R2P was the conflict over the result of the elections in Kenya on December 
27, 2007. Unrest, looting, rape and violent clashes between various political groups and 
security forces quickly acquired an ethnic dimension, because the government’s supporters 
and the main opposition group came from different ethnic groups (Jacobs 2011: 5–7). 
Approximately 1,500 people died and hundreds of thousands fled. After several attempts at 
mediation by African states had failed, a mediation mission of the African Union led by 
Kofi Annan attempted to find a resolution. With international assistance, success was 
achieved in forming a national unity government and ending the crisis (Jacobs 2011: 7). 
Although no direct reference was made to the R2P at that time, the crisis was subsequently 
classified as a case of successfully applying it by Kofi Annan and advocates of the R2P 
(Annan 2009). 
Two disputes, which contributed to clarifying the scope of application for the R2P, were 
initiated by France and Russia in 2008. Despite massive devastation as a result of Cyclone 
Nargis in May 2008, Myanmar’s government initially refused to give international 
humanitarian relief organizations access to the affected areas. France demanded that, in the 
sense of R2P, the international community had an obligation to rush to the aid of needy 
people in Myanmar, even against the will of the governing military junta. Ultimately, the 
regional organization ASEAN was able to convince the military junta to open its borders for 
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humanitarian aid. Although France’s threat of intervention added weight to the efforts of 
ASEAN, the French interpretation of the area of application was rejected by most states, 
even strong R2P advocates. Such an extension threatened to cast doubt on the compromise 
of 2005 (Badescu/Weiss 2010: 9). In the summer of 2008, Russia tried to justify the war 
against Georgia based on R2P: Following a Georgian offensive against secessionist rebels in 
South Ossetia at the beginning of August 2008, Russia reacted by sending soldiers into the 
region to stop the attacks by the Georgian army. The Russian government argued that it had 
the right and was required by its constitution to prevent genocide against the South 
Ossetian secessionists of Russian origin and to “fulfill the responsibility to protect” (MFA 
Russia 2008). This reference to the R2P found no support from other states – especially as 
the main rationale for Russia to exercise its right to self-defense took the form of protecting 
Russians and citizens of Russian origin (Badescu/Weiss 2010: 11). 
Kenya provided supporters of R2P with an example of a reaction to atrocities that lay 
below the threshold for the application of force. In Myanmar and South Ossetia, there were 
conflicting views on what the scope of application meant, with the result that the majority of 
those who spoke out agreed that these cases did not fall under the set of R2P norms. These 
disputes over its applicability made the scope of application for the R2P more specific: It can 
only be applied in cases of the four kinds of crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and ethnic cleansing. 
4.1  Debates in the General Assembly on R2P 
Against this background, on the basis of discussions with member states, Edward Luck, 
Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect (see Section 6.1), 
developed the three pillars of the R2P in the first report of the Secretary-General to the 
General Assembly regarding implementation of R2P: Responsibility of the individual state, 
international support and the rapid and decisive reaction of the international community 
(Ban 2009). This division into different components was intended to clarify Ban Ki-moon‘s 
“narrow but deep” approach: All available instruments should be employed for both 
prevention and response, whereas the scope of application should remain narrowly focused: 
By applying R2P, it should now be possible to react to the four crimes, but not to other 
serious crises such as natural catastrophes (Bellamy 2012: 18).  
The report was first discussed on July 23, 2009 in an informal interactive dialogue with 
experts, before the General Assembly officially discussed the topic on the following days. 
The President of the UN General Assembly, Miguel D’Escoto from Nicaragua, attempted to 
prevent a resolution on the R2P. He presented a concept paper disputing the legitimacy of 
the summit resolution and presented R2P in the context of European colonialism (President 
of the 63rd General Assembly 2009). He concluded that the collective security arrangement 
of the UN was not an instrument for achieving human rights, but for maintaining 
international security: 
Colonialism and interventionism used responsibility to protect arguments. National 
Sovereignty in developing countries is a necessary condition for stable access to political, social 
and economic rights and it took enormous sacrifices to recover this sovereignty and ensure 
these rights for their populations. […] The concept of responsibility to protect is a sovereign’s 
obligation and, if it is exercised by an external agency, sovereignty passes from the people of the 
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target country to it [the external agency]. The people to be protected are transformed from 
bearers of rights to wards of this agency (President of the 63rd General Assembly 2009). 
Only Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Malaysia, Sudan and Venezuela 
openly supported this point of view and expressed their disapproval of the resolution 
adopted by the World Summit. Others including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and 
especially Brazil, China, Iran and Pakistan, were skeptical and called for further discussion 
of the compromise reached on R2P in 2005. 
In general, although agreement with the report of the Secretary-General was expressed 
in the debate, it became apparent that support for the set of norms as a whole did not run 
particularly deep. Precisely the third pillar of the R2P – the international reaction to 
atrocities – was met with considerable reservation among UN member states: This might 
serve as a formula for justifying intervention without a UN mandate and potentially serve 
the goal of forced regime change, while thresholds for the application of the R2P were cited 
as being unclear (see also GCR2P 2009 in the following section). Double standards and a 
lack of consistency in the reactions of the Security Council were criticized. Its constitution 
and working methods were seen by some states as the real cause for its inability to act in the 
face of atrocities. In addition, a few states feared that the R2P would strengthen the role of 
the Security Council in relation to the General Assembly, i.e., the Security Council would 
receive additional authority to supervise the internal affairs of member states. The crimes 
being addressed by R2P were said to be rooted in underdevelopment and poverty, and the 
UN was encouraged to focus its resources on combating these root causes of conflicts. 
However, many states supported Ban Ki-moon’s call for the permanent members to refrain 
from using their veto right in connection with mass crimes. 
After D’Escoto closed the debate without any decision, a group of states under the 
leadership of Guatemala began negotiations on a resolution (Serrano 2011: 435). Western 
states initially feared that such a project could be hijacked by skeptics to block 
implementation of R2P. Interestingly, in the search for supporters, Guatemala found an 
important ally in India, which had expressed strong criticism of R2P in 2005. According to a 
statement by a diplomat who was involved, the group led by Guatemala initially lobbied for 
a resolution among developing nations in order to increase the credibility of the initiative, 
and accepted Western support only after broad support in the South became apparent. The 
draft resolution, which was ultimately tabled by 67 states, contained no content-related 
statement on the R2P, merely acknowledgment of the report of the Secretary-General and 
the intention of the General Assembly to continue to work on the R2P. The General 
Assembly adopted it unanimously on September 14, 2009 as Resolution 63/308. 
Every year since 2009, discussion on R2P takes place in “informal interactive dialogues” 
of the General Assembly. Such dialogue allows member states to discuss the yearly reports 
of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the responsibility to protect. These 
reports have covered the topics of early warning (Ban 2010), the role of regional 
organizations in implementing the responsibility to protect (Ban 2011), the third pillar (Ban 
2012b), responsibility of individual states (Ban 2013a) and possibilities for supporting the 
state in meeting its responsibility (Ban 2014). In 2015, the discussion focussed on stock 
taking after 10 years and setting the priorities for R2P’s implementation in the upcoming 
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decade (Ban 2015). The number of states which speak in these informal dialogues is 
constantly increasing: 
Figure 2: Number of states participating in the UN’s R2P debates from 2009–2015 
 
Source: Author’s own diagram 
 
R2P is also addressed as a topic by about 20 states every year during the annual general 
debates at the beginning of the General Assembly session. Consequently, it has been gaining 
more attention in the international discourse. Increasingly broad support is also being 
expressed in statements on the R2P, especially in connection with its first and second pillars. 
This becomes also apparent in resolutions adopted by the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC): three resolutions on the genocide prevention and nine related to country-specific 
situations refer to R2P. 7 
However, the fact that only about a third of all states take part in the informal talks on 
the R2P should not be overlooked. If the critical mass of states described above, the criticism 
of which can cast doubt on the previously described validity of a norm, is taken as a 
benchmark, it must be admitted that due to limited participation in the dialogues, it cannot 
be said with certainty how many states are really supporting the set of norms as a whole. 
The criticism dating from 2005 and 2009 is still present in the ongoing debate. 
Controversy flared up again, especially following intervention in Libya by NATO in 2011 
(see Section 5.1). The third pillar of the R2P continues to be very controversial. However, 
criticism is often not clearly formulated in statements by the states. Many states, especially 
in Latin America and Southeast Asia, continue to take a critical view of R2P. In view of the 
history of imperial interventions in these regions, every potential backdoor for external 
interference is regarded with skepticism. Although many countries support the idea of 
preventing atrocities, R2P is still viewed in the context of the debates over the right to 
humanitarian intervention dating back to the 1990s, as can be seen in the following quote 
from a conversation of a South American diplomat with the author in summer 2014: 
It is an idea you cannot buy wholesale without qualification. […] this is an idea that is to be 
implemented predominantly in the developing world, but not in the US, Israel or France. 
Almost unconsciously but manifestly, people are talking about the protection of civilians in 
 
 
7  HRC Resolutions 7/25 (2008), 22/22 (2013), and 28/34 (2015) on genocide prevention; and HRC 
Resolutions 14/14 (2010) on Kyrgyzstan, 14/15 (2010) on Afghanistan, S-15/1 on Libya, and Resolutions 
19/22 (2012), 22/24 (2013), 23/1 (2013), 23/26 (2013), 25/23 (2013), and 26/23 (2014) on Syria.  
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weak and poor countries. From an historical point of view, this is unfair. […] The most 
shocking crimes were committed by developed countries. In a way, the idea of R2P is used to 
whitewash the guilt of the powerful states without them acknowledging this guilt. 
The UN Secretariat and other states are seeking to counter such skeptical attitudes with 
concrete initiatives for implementing R2P and, in this way, to lobby for their interpretation 
of R2P as a holistic framework with three linked pillars. In addition to the attempt by the 
Secretary-General to use his reports to steer the debate in the direction of prevention, there 
have been a few state initiatives for the concrete implementation and institutional 
anchoring of R2P at the national and regional level, which I will present in Section 6. 
However, I will first look at the most active players in the international discussion on the 
R2P, because their initiatives and lobbying were decisive in development of the 
responsibility to protect. 
4.2  The Group of Friends of R2P and NGOs 
Even prior to the World Summit, Canada had begun to gather together like-minded states 
in an informal Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. This was initially led by 
Canada and Rwanda and now meets under the chairmanship of the Netherlands and 
Rwanda. Among the approximately 45 members are the European Union and states from 
all the continents. Representatives of civil society and the UN Secretariat also participate in 
the group’s meetings.8 It meets as circumstances require and coordinates its positioning for 
R2P related debates in UN fora and the annual interactive dialogues on R2P. 
In addition to this, it is civil society actors in particular who are trying to advance the 
R2P debate in the UN context. Following publication of the ICISS report and in the lead-up 
to the World Summit, Canada sought to establish a transnational network of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Banda 2007) and received support from, among 
others, the World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP)9 as well as 
Oxfam International. In cooperation with Canada, WFM-IGP had already organized 
consultations with other NGOs on R2P in 2002 after publication of the ICISS report, 
according to statements made by ICRtoP staff members to the author. The result was the 
R2P Engaging Civil Society (R2P-CS) project, which starting in 2003 strove to advocate R2P 
on the international agenda under the leadership of WFM-IGP and Oxfam. Even after the 
World Summit, R2P-CS played an important role by creating a network of NGOs, making 
information available to the public and actively lobbying the permanent missions in New 
York (Bellamy 2009: 71–73; ICRtoP 2009). Oxfam also continued to refer to R2P as a frame-
work for campaigns for the protection of civilians in the years following the World Summit. 
However, ever since the 2011 Libya intervention and given the failure of the UN in Syria, 
Oxfam no longer sees R2P as a useful tool with regard to calls for more intensive protection 
of civilians (Cairns 2014). 
 
 
8  Global Centre for the R2P, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect and UN Office of the 
Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. 
9  Founded in 1947, the WFM-IGP focuses on peace and security policy issues, UN reform, democracy, 
environmental protection and protection of civilians. Its headquarters are in New York and it is financed 
through foundations and contributions from Western governments. See: WFM-IGP 2015. 
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Globally, two organizations are currently the most influential in the R2P debate: The 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP)10 and the Global Center 
for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)11, as well as the Asia-Pacific Center for the 
Responsibility to Protect (AP-R2P)12 at the regional level. Through regular contact with 
diplomats in the permanent missions in New York and capital cities of member states, these 
organizations are able to wield substantial influence on the debate. ICRtoP serves, above all, 
as a conveyor belt between 89 NGOs, which are mainly active at the local or national level, 
and the international discourse in New York (ICRtoP 2015). According to various 
diplomats from the Group of Friends of the R2P, GCR2P functions in particular as a 
comprehensive information service provider and institutional memory: “I never had so 
many phone calls on any other dossier I have been working on regarding what to say and 
what not to say,” said a diplomat from one EU member state. A comprehensive briefing is 
offered to diplomats who take over that area of responsibility for the first time. In 
preparations for all debates related to the topic, GCR2P makes contact with the permanent 
missions and tries to convince these to at least take an official stance and adopt GCR2P’s 
key messages. By monitoring relevant crisis situations, the organization also influences 
debate on the application of the third pillar. The AP-R2P influences the debate by means of 
academic work and attempts at the regional level to persuade people, for example most 
recently as the secretariat of a high-ranking expert group which formulated 
recommendations for integrating R2P within the ASEAN Community (see Section 6.4). 
The work of the ICRtoP, GCR2P and AP-R2P nongovernmental organizations, which is 
focused on strengthening the recognition of R2P as a set of obligatory international norms, 
is supported by the activities of organizations seeking to prevent atrocities and genocide. 
The Stanley Foundation13 is notably active and focuses mainly on organizing dialogue 
events with UN officials, government employees, diplomats and NGOs, with the goal of 
strengthening and further developing protection norms, as well as achieving practical 
implementation of these by exchanging best-practices of implementation (The Stanley 
Foundation 2015). It also cooperates with the GCR2P, for instance in the organization of 
workshops for the Focal Point Network coordinated by GCR2P (The Stanley Foundation 
2012) (see Section 6.4). 
The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), which is based in New 
York and Poland, focuses on the practical implementation of atrocity prevention without 
 
 
10  The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) is the successor organization of 
R2P-CS and was founded in January 2009 by eight regional and international NGOs.  
11  The creation of the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) was initiated in 2007 by 
Gareth Evans and a group of NGOs (International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam Inter-
national, WFM-IGP, and Refugees International) and quickly received support from the governments of 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Rwanda and Great Britain, as well as the Open 
Society Institute (Evans 2007). GCR2P has an international Board under the leadership of the ICISS co-
chairs Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun.  
12  The Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect (AP-R2P) is based at the University of Queens-
land in Australia and is pursuing the goal of promoting recognition of R2P in Southeast Asia.  
13  Headquartered in Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation was founded in 1956 with a peace and 
security orientation. It is a member of the ICRtoP Network. 
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direct reference to R2P.14 On one hand, AIPR works directly with governments and regional 
organizations, such as the AU, on the development and implementation of policies, and on 
education of government officials, diplomats, soldiers and aid workers in this area, for 
example within the framework of the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass 
Atrocity Prevention (AIPR 2015b) (see Section 6.4). On the other hand, the institute 
cooperates with the UN Office for Genocide Prevention and R2P in its training program for 
UN officials and diplomats.  
Moreover, the R2P debate is being shaped by a loose group of diplomats, researchers, 
practitioners and former politicians. Individuals such as Gareth Evans, Edward Luck, 
Ramesh Thakur, Alex Bellamy, Thomas Weiss or the current US Ambassador to the UN, 
Samantha Power, and others have had a decisive influence on the development of the R2P 
through their intellectual contributions as well as through their shifts among various 
positions in state, civil and international organizations, think tanks and the media (Karlsrud 
2013).  
The close cooperation among the civil society, committed individuals, government 
officials and the UN Secretariat have made possible the comparatively rapid development of 
R2P from an idea to a set of norms that is, nominally at least, becoming more and more 
firmly embedded in the UN despite substantial skepticism within the community of states.15 
But this is also viewed in a critical manner by states from the south: The GCR2P is primarily 
funded by Western countries (Evans 2008: 238), and the AP-R2P mainly by the Australian 
government (AP-R2P 2015). In press statements and events organized by these NGOs, but 
also in many academic publications, the level of acceptance of R2P among states is being 
exaggerated in part (for critical comment, see Daase 2013). The example of Southeast Asia 
shows that the R2P and its components are still highly controversial. Local initiatives are 
often started by external actors who often narrow R2P down to the first two pillars in order 
to avoid provoking resistance (Capie 2012). 
Nowadays, precisely because of this propagation of R2P, the organizations and 
individuals that have been referred to play a central role in keeping the topic on the UN’s 
agenda. The civil society pressure on member states and the funds made available for 
information and education, crisis monitoring, lobbying and conference organization, as 
well as the atrocity prevention initiatives supported by these organizations are all significant 
factors for R2P’s substantial presence in the international discourse. Exaggeration is one of 
the strategies utilized by these organizations for strengthening the R2P. This is particularly 
obvious in the UN Security Council.  
 
 
14  Since 2008 the AIPR, which was founded in Auschwitz in 2005 and has been registered in the US since 
2007, has offered an educational program and technical support for developing and strengthening global, 
national and regional policies for the prevention of genocide and atrocities. 
15 These can be referred to as so-called “advocacy coalition” (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 1–2), network of different 
actors with shared values and convictions, pursuing common goals in the political security domain, 
without presenting themselves as a closed group. 
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4.3 Prerogative of interpretation and Security Council debates on R2P 
Despite widely held reservations in the community of states, affirmative references to the 
R2P are occurring more and more frequently in resolutions of the Security Council, even 
four times more frequently since the Libya intervention than in the preceding five years16. 
 
But the growing number of references to the R2P is not proof of diminishing controversy, 
even though NGOs often present it in that light. The type of references already makes this 
obvious: Two-thirds of the 38 total mentions of the R2P by name were related to the non-
controversial first pillar – even in cases such as Libya or Ivory Coast, where measures under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter were adopted against the government. Eight resolutions 
(21%) referred to the R2P as a whole, of which two referred directly to concrete situations in 
a particular country (Sudan 2006, South Sudan 2014). However, not only written references 
are decisive, but more importantly whether R2P is acknowledged as providing a normative 
framework for Council action during particular crisis situations. 
NGOs such as GCR2P or ICRtoP draw attention to R2P references by diplomats and 
Security Council resolutions as proof that it and its three pillars exist as norms and that a 
practice of its application is emerging. A certain exaggeration of the significance of such 
references is aimed at providing an authoritative interpretation of conceptual references in 
Security Council resolutions, and thereby at nominally strengthening the R2P. As an NGO 
staff member says in an interview with the author in summer 2014:  
By collecting ‘R2P language’ in Security Council Resolutions and Member states’ statements, 
[R2P advocates] try to collect evidence for an existing opinio juris that R2P exists as a norm. 
 
 
16  Resolutions referring to R2P between 2005 and the end of February 2011: 1653 (2006) on the Congo and 
Burundi, 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, 1706 (2006) on 
Sudan/Darfur, 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) on Libya.  
 Resolutions referring to R2P between March 2011 and August 2015: 1975 (2011) and 2226 (2015) on 
Ivory Coast; 1996 (2011), 2109 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), and 2223 (2015) on South 
Sudan; 2014 (2011) on Yemen; 2016 (2011), 2040 (2012) and 2095 (2013) on Libya; 2085 (2012), 2100 
(2013), 2164 (2014), and 2227 (2015) on Mali; 2093 (2013) on Somalia; 2117 (2013) and 2220 (2015) on 
small arms and light weapons; 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2149 (2014), 2196 (2015), and 2217 
(2015) on the Central African Republic; 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014) on Syria; 2150 (2014) on protection 
against genocide; 2171 (2014) on prevention of armed conflicts; and 2185 (2014) on the role of the police 
in peacekeeping missions; as well as 2211 (2015) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and 2228 
(2015) on Sudan. 
Figure 3: References to the three pillars of the R2P in Security Council resolutions 
Source: Author’s own presentation, period covered: September 2005–August 2015. 
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This is important, since R2P is a young norm and there is always the danger that that what the 
member states’ governments say is just political theater […]. It is a tactic of R2P advocates to 
overstate the Security Council Resolution’s language on R2P, to show that R2P matters.  
This tactic of exaggeration of the significance of the R2P is used because it is easier to 
further develop moral norms such as the R2P in the UN context when they have been 
accepted as part of the UN language and used in resolutions. After all, in contrast to 
contract law norms, there is no explicitly accepted obligation of the states to adhere to the 
norms. The World Summit document from 2005 is merely a non-binding resolution of the 
General Assembly. The goal of R2P norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs and the states in the 
Group of Friends of the R2P is thus to have all components of the R2P accepted as part of 
customary international law. However, a prerequisite for this would be universal acceptance 
of all its components among the community of states and among international law experts, 
as well as consistent application by the Security Council. R2P norm entrepreneurs are trying 
to increase social pressure for observing the norm: States should protect their populations 
and, in extreme cases, the Security Council should intervene. The more possibilities for 
reference that exist, the greater this pressure becomes and the easier it is to make reference 
to them in similar cases. 
5. Controversial application of R2P by the Security Council 
References to R2P and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in thematic Security 
Council resolutions both show that the responsibility to protect is at least referred to as a 
normative reference framework in the Security Council. However, agreements on concrete 
applications are only reached with difficulty. Acceptance of the set of norms in the R2P has 
not yet been achieved, although the controversy is limited to questions of applicability, 
implementation, and to a lesser degree on validity of the norms constituting the set (see 
also: Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013). The third pillar is intended to include the use of force 
as the last resort and only in situations in which there are adequate prospects of success with 
regard to protection of threatened population groups. As a rule, diplomatic pressure, 
observer missions, imposing sanctions or referral of the case to the International Criminal 
Court are the preferred forms of reaction as long as they effectively lead to improvement of 
the situation of the people involved (Hofmann 2013: 10–11). Application of the third pillar 
is especially controversial when the Security Council applies force to meet its responsibility 
to protect or when recourse to such measures is called for. This was shown to be the case in 
2011 in the disputes over Libya and Syria, but also in the broader context of protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts by UN Blue Helmet missions, as well as recourse to the 
International Criminal Court in response to atrocities. 
5.1 Intervention in Libya 
After the Libyan strongman Muammar al-Gaddafi had demonstrations put down in eastern 
Libya in February 2011, the situation quickly escalated into an armed uprising (Ulfstein/ 
Christiansen 2013: 159–160). In view of Gaddafi’s announcement that he wanted to clear 
Libya “house by house” of rebellious “rats” and “cockroaches,” France and Great Britain 
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were initially able to win the support of the US and later Russia and China for a Security 
Council resolution condemning Gaddafi's crackdown. Resolution 1970, which was accepted 
unanimously on February 26, contains not only a reference to R2P and a weapons embargo 
and specific sanctions, but also a referral of the case to the International Criminal Court 
(Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 2014: 11–12). When the resolution failed to have the desired effect, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League called for a no-fly zone. The African states 
in the UN Security Council (Gabun, Nigeria and South Africa), by contrast, demanded the 
recognition of a mediation initiative started at the beginning of March by the African Union 
(AU). Rapid escalation made it possible for France and Great Britain to prevail with their 
assessment of the situation: In Libya, especially in Benghazi, extremely serious atrocities 
were to be expected, so that a direct response by the international community was required, 
even though the AU initiative was welcomed (Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 2014: 11–13). In view 
of the international pressure, those opposed to the use of force (Brazil, China, India, Russia 
and Germany) abstained from voting. Russia and China’s failure to use their veto was also 
due to a lack of political interest in Libya. On March 17, 2011 the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1973 in which it authorized member states to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians in Libya and to impose a no-fly zone. 
Despite this resolution, it became clear that no consistent international interpretation 
existed on the actual application of R2P in such a case: the P3 (France, Great Britain, and 
the US), supported by Bosnia, Lebanon and others, regarded immediate international 
intervention as the only appropriate response. The AU, by contrast, regarded mediation to 
be appropriate in order to remind the parties to the conflict of their obligations according to 
international humanitarian law and to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
(Zähringer 2013: 196–197). India and Brazil shared this view and took a skeptical view of 
recourse to Chapter VII (UN Security Council 2011a). 
The disagreement over an appropriate response escalated into a dispute over how the 
operation should be carried out. The airborne attacks of the P3 on Libya began on March 19 
and were supported by other NATO countries as well as Qatar and the UAE. This was 
immediately criticized by Russia and African countries especially. The latter had planned a 
mediation mission for March 20 which the intervention coalition forbade because it was 
said to be too dangerous given the situation. By mid-April 2011 a military stalemate 
between government forces and rebels had been reached. At this, US President Obama, his 
French counterpart Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron announced on April 14 
that there could be no democratic transition in Libya with Gaddafi (Obama et al. 2011). The 
continuing efforts of the AU to reach a solution the “African way,” i.e., through mediation, 
became more and more marginalized (Dembinski/Peters 2015: 12–15; Dembinski/Reinold 
2011: 11; Ulfstein/Christiansen 2013: 165). When NATO began to coordinate its air strikes 
with the rebels as they advanced on areas controlled by Gaddafi, this was no longer covered 
by Resolution 1973 (Ulfstein/Christiansen 2013: 169). This expansive interpretation of the 
mandate by the NATO countries and their allies was criticized not only by China and 
Russia, but also by Brazil, India, South Africa and the AU. 
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5.2 R2P and the Syrian civil war 
The conflict on the appropriate way to respond to atrocities was evident in the debate over 
how to respond to the Syrian Civil War. During 2011 the Syrian government, under Bashar 
al-Assad and its loyal military, reacted to more and more widespread protests by using 
massive violence. In response to this, a Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed by former 
members of the armed forces and by opponents of the regime in order to protect 
demonstrators. Beginning in August 2011, the FSA and other militias began to attack Syrian 
security forces and a spiral of violence developed into a civil war which continues today (on 
the Syrian conflict, see: Kirchner 2014). According to a UN Human Rights Council 
Commission of Inquiry, war crimes and crimes against humanity, also those committed by 
various militias supporting the opposition, occur on a regular basis (OHCHR 2015). 
In August 2011 the Security Council under Indian presidency was able to agree on a 
joint Presidential Statement on Syria. The continuing violence was condemned and, at the 
same time, Syria’s sovereignty was confirmed (UN Security Council 2011b). An initial draft 
resolution on Syria in October 2011 was blocked by the vetoes of Russia and China. Brazil, 
India, Lebanon and South Africa abstained. In the threat of sanctions and further steps, they 
identified a scenario reminiscent of Libya (UN Security Council 2011c). A Russian 
resolution initiative in December 2011 never came to a vote (UN Security Council 2012b). 
Further draft resolutions in February (UN Security Council 2012a) and July 2012 (UN 
Security Council 2012b) were rejected by Russia and China. Observer missions to Syria 
undertaken by the Arab League and the UN (Resolution 2032 and 2043 in April 2012) failed 
due to a lack of cooperation by Syrian government agencies. Two special negotiators, Kofi 
Annan and his successor Lakdhar Brahimi, resigned from their positions because political 
resolve on the part of the international community was lacking. Peace conferences in 
Geneva were also unsuccessful. Not until August 2013, in reaction to a poison gas attack on 
a suburb of Damascus, was the Security Council able to find an agreement. Resolution 2118 
called for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. In February 2014, the Security 
Council finally condemned laying siege to residential areas, the use of barrel bombs and 
terrorist attacks, and called for the parties to the conflict to permit cross-border 
humanitarian aid as well as aid in besieged areas (Resolution 2139). Since this showed no 
effects, in July 2014 the Security Council decided to authorize cross-border access for 
humanitarian aid by UN partner organizations in Syria, even without the agreement of the 
Syrian government (Resolution 2165). This authorization was reaffirmed in Resolution 
2191 in December 2014. Despite this, millions of people are still cut off from international 
humanitarian aid to this day. 
Only the advance in Iraq and Syria of the ISIS militia, whose proclamation of an Islamic 
State in the occupied territories and the open threat to kill anybody who refused to convert 
to their radical variant of Sunni Islam or pay religious taxes, triggered a coordinated 
international response. At the invitation of the Iraqi government, a multinational coalition 
led by the US is now carrying out operations against ISIS. The official justification for air 
strikes against ISIS on Iraqi and Syrian soil is based only on Iraq’s right to collective self-
defense, not on R2P or a UN mandate, even though the OSAPG condemned atrocities 
committed by ISIS several times and demanded coordinated regional and international 
action to ensure the protection of the population. 
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The consequences of the Arab Spring represented a challenge for the humanitarian 
protection regime. Events in Libya led to a renewed outbreak along the lines of diplomatic 
conflict present during the World Summit and also in 2009, i.e., the accusation that the R2P 
is a cover for a policy of forced regime change. At the same time, in connection with Syria, 
the accusations of selectivity and lack of a political will emerged again. The long delay for a 
response to the atrocities in Syria to emerge contrasts starkly with the comparatively rapid 
mobilization of an international intervention coalition against ISIS. The Syrian war has 
exposed the limitations of R2P given that the Security Council is not able to agree on a 
strategy to stop the continuing serious atrocities in Syria because of conflicts of geopolitical 
interests, and, so far, the people responsible have not had to reckon with later being made to 
answer for their deeds (Hehir 2012). 
But, because these conflicts have to do with the application and implementation of the 
third pillar of the R2P and not with the general validity of the norms of protection, until 
now they have not led to a deterioration of R2P as a norm set but to reform initiatives in 
connection with the third pillar (see Section 6.2). 
5.3 R2P and protection of civilians in armed conflicts 
In his annual report on the implementation of the R2P in 2012, the Secretary-General 
referred explicitly to the controversial discussions on the nature of a “timely and decisive 
response,” and discussed the tools available for implementing R2P under the Charter, as 
well as their application so far (Ban 2012b). The debate, which, after Libya, had been 
restricted to the use of force, should be broadened again in this way and, at the same time, 
give consideration to the strong skepticism about military measures. Consequently, he 
discussed the relationship of the three pillars of the R2P and rejected the call for strict 
separation: Prevention, international support and response are linked to each other. 
The report sees UN peacekeeping operations as one of the instruments under the R2P 
but, at the same time, emphasizes that the protection of civilians in armed conflicts is a 
separate issue with specific goals. Since Blue Helmet missions are always mandated on the 
basis of agreement of the country where they take place, they are not mostly regarded by 
UN member states as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a state. For this 
reason, the norm of including protection of civilians in the mandate of peacekeeping 
operations (Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – PoC), which was established in 
1999, is widely accepted in the community of states.17 The concern in the UN Secretariat was 
that a too extended overlapping of PoC mandates with R2P language could once again 
disrupt the consensus on such mandates, possibly making it more difficult in the future to 
achieve resolutions and troop contribution commitments in these areas (van Steenberghe 
2014: 97–98). For this reason, in 2012 Ban Ki-moon emphasized the differences in the 
Security Council:  
 
 
17  However, the broad acceptance had only limited effect in actual practice on the ground: A UN report 
from February 2014 concluded that, despite having a mandate, Blue Helmet missions seldom made use of 
force to protect civilians (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2014). 
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While the two concepts share some common elements, particularly with regard to prevention 
and support of national authorities in discharging their responsibilities towards civilians, there 
are fundamental differences. First, the protection of civilians is a legal concept based on 
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, while the responsibility to protect is 
a political concept, set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome […]. Second, there are 
important differences in their scope. The protection of civilians relates to violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict. The 
responsibility to protect is limited to violations that constitute war crimes or crimes against 
humanity or that would be considered acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Crimes against 
humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing may occur in situations that do not meet the 
threshold of armed conflict (Ban 2012a: 5–6). 
Despite this, the connection of mandates to protect civilians with the R2P is still used by 
advocates of the R2P to promote embedding of the R2P in Security Council resolutions (van 
Steenberghe 2014: 88–92; Loges 2013: 237–283). The first instance of the R2P being cited in 
a resolution of the Security Council is in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of 
civilians, where there is a reference to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit 
document, and this is repeated in Resolution 1706 (2006) on the deploying of a UN mission 
to Darfur (which, however, had no effect). The close relation becomes even clearer in 
Resolution 1894 (2009) which not only confirms the paragraphs on R2P but also explicitly 
emphasizes that paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit document are “the relevant 
provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict” (S/RES/1894). Ban Ki-moon also supported this interrelation 
and had already included the R2P in the normative framework of the agenda on protection 
of civilians in his report on protection of civilians in 2007 (Ban 2007b: paras. 10–11).  
The distinction between the R2P and the protection of civilians is often deliberately 
neglected by advocates of the R2P. As a result, the states are unable to agree whether and 
how a resolution refers to the R2P, as shown in the comment of a UN staff member in an 
interview with the author: “The Council hasn’t talked about R2P for a long time. What 
some states see as PoC- or IHL-language do other states interpret as references to R2P. 
Hence, when states negotiate over SC (Security Council) resolutions, there is no consensus 
on whether or not they are talking about R2P” (paraphrased by the author). The hope of 
R2P advocates is that, through references in Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping 
operations, the R2P norms will derive benefit from recognition of the norm of protection of 
civilians. 
5.4 Protection of civilians and regime change: Ivory Coast 
A significant overlap of references to the responsibility to protect and the protection of 
civilians by peacekeeping operations occurred at the beginning of 2011 in reaction to the 
escalating situation in Ivory Coast. After the elections on November 28, 2010, the president 
holding office, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to vacate his position in favor of Alassane Outtara, 
who was internationally recognized as the winner of the election. Instead, he sealed off the 
borders, expelled foreign media and violently opposed Outtara’s supporters (on the 
background to this conflict, see: Krempel 2010). Part of the mandate of the UN mission, 
UNOCI, which has been present in the country since 2004, was protection of civilians, in 
addition to supervision of the peace treaty agreed upon in 2003 to end the civil war. In 
addition, French soldiers, who were also in the country, were to provide military support to 
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UNOCI if it became necessary (Security Council Report 2011: 20). In Resolution 1962 on 
December 20, 2010, although Russia and China had previously regarded the conflict over 
the elections as a purely domestic issue of Ivory Coast, the Security Council called for an 
end to violence, supported the recognition of Outtara, extended the mandate of UNOCI 
and authorized a temporary increase in the number of soldiers (Security Council Report 
2011: 21). Despite all appeals, the situation continued to escalate. Outtara’s supporters, the 
Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (RFCI), took up arms against Gbagbo and his 
supporters. Attempts at mediation and threats to take the matter before the ICC met with 
no success (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 834). Both parties to the conflict were accused of the 
massacre of civilians. On March 21, Nigeria criticized the idea that the international 
community was protecting populations in Libya with an air exclusion zone, while it stood 
by and watched the killing of innocent people in Ivory Coast (Security Council Report 2011: 
23). On March 30, 2011, the Security Council referred in Resolution 1975 to the 
“responsibility of each State to protect civilians” and confirmed the mandate of UNOCI to 
adopt all measures necessary for the protection of civilians. Finally, UNOCI and French 
helicopters engaged Gbagbo’s forces, which made it possible for the RFCI to gain control of 
the capital city within two weeks and arrest Gbagbo.  
This use of force blurred the boundaries between humanitarian protection and an 
enforced regime change, and raised question about interference in internal affairs as well as 
about the neutrality and impartiality of the UN peacekeepers (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 835). 
Because the mission was no longer neutral, South Africa was critical of the fact that the UN 
had exceeded its mandate by recognizing Outtara and that UNOCI had failed to prevent 
attacks on civilians. Russia, China and India criticized the actions as an inappropriate taking 
of sides in an internal conflict (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 835-836; Security Council Report 
2011: 23). Ban Ki-moon defended the measures adopted by UNOCI as being necessary to 
carry out the PoC mandate: At no point did UNOCI coordinate its activities with Outtara’s 
forces (Security Council Report 2011: 23).  
Closely resembling the Libya situation, the diplomatic conflict in this case centered on 
the implementation of the mandate from the Security Council. The criticism was not 
directed against the use of force to protect civilians per se, but against the fact that it favored 
one of the parties to an internal conflict. Even though the criticism quickly faded away, the 
Ivory Coast case demonstrated the potential for conflict stemming from combining the two 
overlapping, but nevertheless different, agendas of the R2P and the protection of civilians by 
Blue Helmets (see also Dembinski/Peters 2015). 
5.5 The International Criminal Court and R2P 
Short of military measures and apart from sanctions, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is also understood as a Security Council instrument for implementing the R2P. While 
Russia and the US have not ratified and China not signed or acceded to the Rome Statute – 
the treaty which established the ICC – all three countries have expressed repeated 
skepticism about an independent international criminal court. Nonetheless, there have been 
repeated cases of the Security Council referring cases to the ICC in response to atrocities: 
the case of the Sudanese region of Darfur in March 2005 and the case of Libya in February 
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2011. In other cases, which were also discussed internationally in connection with the R2P, 
the ICC itself instituted proceedings in states parties to the Statute of Rome (Kenya in 2008, 
Ivory Coast in 2011), or else the opening of proceedings was requested by the country in 
question itself, such as Uganda in 2004, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004, the 
Central African Republic in 2007 and 2014, as well as Mali in 2012 (Fehl 2014: 29). How-
ever, utilizing the ICC is controversial. Recently, African states have vehemently criticized 
the court because they perceive the focus on African conflicts as one-sided until now.  
Even within the Group of Friends of the R2P, whether and in what way the ICC will be 
used as an instrument in terms of the R2P is controversial, because the African states are 
expressing doubts in this matter (Fehl 2014: 14–16). In addition, the question remains of the 
extent to which referral to the International Criminal Court can serve as an instrument not 
only for punishing atrocities but for preventing them at all. This and the question of 
whether, by referring a case to the ICC the Security Council is trying to avoid a necessary 
but more expensive and more robust procedure still needs to be investigated further (Fehl 
2014: 25). 
6. Reducing controversy: institutionalization of the R2P 
Institutionalizing the R2P in the UN was initially intended to help reduce controversy over 
it by creating a forum – the annually held informal interactive dialogue on the R2P – as well 
as appointing a contact person for R2P within the UN system. The Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon, who came into office in 2007, was not afraid to remind the community of states 
of their commitment and to start institutional implementation (Evans 2008: 50–51).  
6.1  UN Office for Genocide Prevention and the R2P 
At the end of 2007, Ban Ki-moon named one of the intellectual initiators of the R2P,18 
Francis Deng, as his Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide19 and nominated 
Columbia University professor Edward Luck as the first Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect (Ban 2007a). This incited controversies. The Fifth Committee of 
the UN General Assembly, which is responsible for budget issues, initially approved no 
financing for the nomination of an R2P special adviser, and only limited funding for the 
proposed joint office of the two advisers. In March 2008 in the Fifth Committee, Cuba, 
Egypt, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sudan and Venezuela once again criticized 
 
 
18  In the mid-1990s, as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis 
Deng introduced the idea of sovereignty as responsibility in connection with humanitarian protection for 
the first time (Deng 1995). 
19  The position of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was created in 2004 and initially 
established at the (unpaid) Assistant Secretary-General level (Annan 2004). The basis for the nomination 
was Security Council Resolution 1366 (2001). With the nomination of Deng, the adviser position, 
previously honorary and on a voluntary basis, was upgraded to a full-time post with the rank of Under-
Secretary-General. Edward Luck, on the other hand, became special adviser in the position of an unpaid 
Assistant Secretary-General. 
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appointment of the special advisers. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 2005 has 
not been a resolution to adopt a R2P policy, it was argued, and in addition, responsibility for 
creating posts lay with the General Assembly, not the Secretariat (United Nations 2008). 
Despite this, Ban Ki-moon exercised his right to nominate an adviser. The first report of 
the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in 2009 
justified this step as being necessary for the conceptual and practical implementation of his 
mandate issued by the General Assembly in the World Summit resolution (Ban 2009: 32–
33). In 2010 his report on implementation of R2P concentrated entirely on early warning 
and observation of situations which could result in mass crimes. He emphasized the 
necessity of exchanging available information among the various UN organizations, 
regional organizations and member states and adopting an R2P perspective in analyzing 
such information. The special adviser and his team were to function as coordinators for 
information gathering and training in this area (Ban 2010). The Fifth Committee did not 
agree to increase office staffing nor acknowledged prevention of the four international 
crimes relevant for R2P as the subject of its work until December 2010 (United Nations 
2010). In this way, the Joint Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and 
the Responsibility to Protect (OSAPG) – the UN Office for Genocide Prevention and R2P – 
was established. In July 2012 the Senegalese diplomat Adama Dieng was named as successor 
to Francis Deng. In July of the following year, Ban Ki-moon named Oxford Professor 
Jennifer Welsh as successor to Ed Luck (Ban 2013a).  
The issue continues to be the subject of persistent controversy in the Fifth Committee. 
R2P skeptics make use of the budget debate to demonstrate their rejection of it. Up to now 
the office barely has ten staff members. Nonetheless, this step toward institutionalization of 
the R2P in the UN Secretariat was decisive for the course of its development: The yearly 
reports on the implementation of the R2P discuss reservations felt by member states. The 
Secretariat strives to limit controversy over the responsibility to protect through the UN 
General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue held in conjunction with yearly reports on 
R2P. 
6.2  Reform initiatives on the third pillar 
Following the Libya intervention, the controversial nature of the R2P led to reform 
initiatives examining the application of the third pillar and the implementation of Security 
Council mandates, as well as the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council. 
In November 2011 Brazil reacted to the conflict over the interpretation of the third pillar 
of the R2P and the perceived misuse of the mandate in Libya with a concept note to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly in which it introduced a “responsibility while 
protecting” proposal (Brazil 2011). According to this, military interventions should be the 
last resort because there is a risk that Security Council mandates could be misused in order 
to compel regime change and interventions could increase the suffering of the local 
population. In the build-up to decisions on interventions, a comprehensive analysis of 
possible consequences should be carried out and the extent of the mandate should be 
limited in both time and operations. Chronological sequencing of the R2P was also called 
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for: The three pillars must be understood as following upon each other in a strictly political 
manner and occur in sequence (Brazil 2011). In addition, Brazil called for a mechanism 
through which the observation of the terms of the mandate and its implementation in the 
field could be reviewed. As the ICISS Report had done earlier, Brazil suggested a series of 
criteria which should guide decision-making on any military action based on the 
responsibility to protect. The RwP concept did not aim at undermining the R2P, but was an 
attempt to strengthen it by taking the misgivings of emerging powers into consideration 
(Stuenkel 2014: 22). This is supported by the fact that Brazil did not reject international 
reactions under the third pillar and, in this context, even gave authority not only to the 
Security Council but, in exceptional circumstances, also to the General Assembly to make 
decisions on the use of military force in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 
377 (V) from 1950 which provides for a special emergency session mechanism. It also later 
relativized the call for sequencing of the three pillars and, in the interactive dialogue of the 
General Assembly on the R2P in 2012, spoke only of logical and no longer of chronological 
sequencing (GCR2P 2012). However, other states have insisted on a time sequence. 
Western states, especially the US, France and Great Britain, initially treated the concept 
note as an attack on actions they had taken in Libya. In the interactive dialogue in the 
General Assembly on the R2P in autumn 2012 France and the US strictly rejected 
sequencing of the three pillars (GCR2P 2012). Together with Great Britain, they defended 
NATO’s behavior in Libya: They argued that all possible effort to protect human life had 
been made. Even though force must always remain a measure of last resort, no other 
behavior was possible. In an informal debate on the concept note in February 2012, 
Germany emphasized that RwP disproportionately restricted the international community’s 
freedom of action, especially in the case of decisive and timely reactions to crises (Benner 
2012: 254). Edward Luck, the UN Special Adviser on the R2P, also took this opportunity to 
criticize the Brazilian initiative: The core problem was not overhasty action but action taken 
too late or not at all in the event of serious atrocities (Luck 2012). Russia and China initially 
criticized Brazil for the statement that in certain situations, international intervention could 
be required (Benner 2012: 255). In the interactive dialogue on the R2P, however, together 
with India and Malaysia, they welcomed the Brazilian motion. India even argued that “[i]f 
R2P is to regain the respect of the international community, it has to be anchored in the 
concept of RwP” (India 2012). South Africa also strongly supported the Brazilian proposal 
during the initial discussion of the concept note. In March 2012, analysts close to the 
Chinese government responded to the RwP initiative with a suggestion of their own entitled 
“responsible protection” and also called for guidelines from the Security Council on the 
application of the R2P, as well as supervision of the implementation of Security Council 
mandates (Garwood-Gowers 2015). 
With Brazil’s RwP concept and China’s Responsible Protection idea, “emerging powers” 
displayed serious interest in further development of the humanitarian protection regime for 
the first time. Even though the RwP initiative was initially rejected by Western countries, an 
attempt at active norm entrepreneurship, which was well received in the global South, can 
be seen here. Brazil’s willingness to negotiate on individual elements of the concept also 
signaled that they really were interested in further development of the R2P (Benner 2012: 
255). Both initiatives sought to take into account misgivings on sovereignty and mistrust of 
stronger regulation of the norm's implementation. Controversy over application and 
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implementation of the third pillar thus led to an attempt to more clearly specify what these 
entailed. The discussion tailed off after Brazil did not call for any further debate on its 
concept. At the same time, the Chinese proposal was regarded skeptically by many 
(Garwood-Gowers 2015). However, the Secretary General referred to RwP in his 2015 
report on R2P and called for an improvement of decision-making in the Security Council, 
monitoring of the mandates’ implementation, and honoring of PoC standards to achieve 
“the goal of responsible protection” (Ban 2015: para. 43). 
The failure of the Security Council to find a common approach to the conflict in Syria 
led to a revival of the debate on suspension of the veto in cases of serious atrocities. Labeling 
themselves the Small Five (S5) – by contrast with the permanent members of the Security 
Council, the Permanent 5 (P5) – in May 2012, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland and Singapore tabled Draft Resolution A/66/L.42/Rev.1 in the General 
Assembly. This discussed the lack of transparency in the Security Council and called for the 
P5 to voluntarily waive exercising the veto in cases of serious atrocities. However, this 
resolution was withdrawn under pressure from the P5 (ICRtoP 2012). The S5 initiative was 
an expression of a wider debate about reform on the working methods of the Security 
Council – quite separate from the debate on enlargement (on the debate on enlargement, 
see Wunderlich 2009). The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group 
founded in May 2013 now has 22 member states and focuses on specific and pragmatic 
reform ideas (Lehmann 2013). Among these is voluntarily setting aside the veto in cases of 
serious atrocities. France took up this initiative in September 2013 and called upon the P5 to 
formulate a code of behavior on using the veto (GCR2P 2014). Both ACT and the French 
initiative were supported by GCR2P both verbally and through lobbying. In an informal 
exchange of views on the subject organized by France and Mexico in September 2014, broad 
consensus among the participating states became apparent (GCR2P 2014). However, 
reservations or even open rejection could be observed among the permanent members: 
Great Britain showed openness for the proposal, but insisted that all five permanent 
members should be in the same boat. The US condemned irresponsible use of the veto, but 
did not explicitly support the initiative. As expected, the proposal was rejected by Russia 
and China. Both states consider their veto power a guarantee of international stability and a 
safeguard against overly hasty interventionism by the P3. In order to put more pressure on 
the P5, the ACT-Group is currently pushing its initiative complementary to the French one. 
ACT is going to circulate a non-paper in the General-Assembly in 2015 on a “Code of 
Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes” (ACT 2015). As in August 2015, the initiative is supported by almost 30 states 
and many civil society organizations. The aim is to persuade all members of the Security 
Council – permanent and non-permanent members – to become signatories of this code of 
conduct. The non-paper is thus not just about veto-restraint, “but represents a broader 
pledge to support timely and decisive Security Council action in such situations” by calling 
for its signatories to not vote against draft Security Council resolutions on action to end or 
prevent mass atrocities (ACT 2015). During the 2015 informal interactive dialogue of the 
General Assembly on R2P, many states referred to such a need for a restraint on the veto 
(GCR2P 2015b). 
As a reform requires amending the UN Charter with the approval of a two-thirds 
majority of the General Assembly and approval of the P5, these initiatives will probably 
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have few institutional consequences. Western diplomats explained to the author that 
instead the debate increases pressure on China and Russia and, in the future, recourse to the 
veto will be “as uncomfortable as possible” for them. Nonetheless, it is apparent here that 
the degree of contention related to application or implementation of R2P can create 
opportunities for reform initiatives. 
6.3  Focus on prevention and the “Human Rights Up Front” action plan 
A further result of the higher degree of controversy surrounding R2P after Libya was that 
the UN Secretariat and other actors intensified their efforts in connection with the 
preventive first and second pillars, responsibility of the state and international support in 
building capacity, because both enjoy broad approval in the community of states. As a 
result, this made the original intention of the ICISS report – making prevention the focal 
point – the object of practical implementation. 
In 2011 the Secretary-General’s R2P report had already concentrated on the role of 
regional organizations in implementing R2P (Ban 2011). As 2011 demonstrated, two key 
determinants affect whether and how the R2P is applied in cases of conflict: first, the 
approval of or even calls by (sub-)regional organizations for international intervention in a 
conflict; second, the form such organizations would prefer for international intervention 
(peaceful, sanction-based, military…). In addition, regional organizations are decisive in the 
prevention of atrocities in their region and in the support of individual states. 
After the debate on the third pillar in 2012, which was made necessary by Libya, the 
Secretariat devoted itself entirely to prevention: In his 2013 report, the Secretary-General 
discussed the primary responsibility of the individual state for the protection of its 
population against the four crimes, as well as risk factors in their occurrence (Ban 2013b). 
He discussed various strategies for prevention and made recommendations to member 
states on the development of social structures which would make them more resistant to 
atrocities occurring. In 2014, the second pillar of the R2P was the subject of the Secretary-
General’s report (Ban 2014). He discussed principles for providing support and possible 
partnerships in connection with the second pillar, as well as the role of the various UN 
committees. In addition, in 2014 the OSAPG presented an analytic framework on early 
recognition of the threat of serious atrocities (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect 2014). The 2015 Report looks at all three pillars but emphasizes 
their interconnected character as “guide for action to prevent and halt” atrocities. Five out 
of six priorities for R2P implementation in the next decade mentioned at the beginning of 
this report focus on prevention and international assistance (Ban 2015: paras. 54–69). 
At the same time, an internal reform process is now underway within the UN. Called 
“Human Rights Up Front,” the reform process seeks to conceptualize the protection and 
strengthening of human rights as a core task across the entire UN organization (United 
Nations 2013). All UN staff members at local sites are required to be alert to signs of human 
rights violations and to report them. This reform was initiated by a commission established 
by Ban Ki-moon to investigate the role of the UN in the late phase of the Sri Lankan civil 
war. In November 2012 this established that the UN had failed in its responsibility to 
protect the innocent in Sri Lanka (United Nations 2012). In the last five months of the war, 
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at least 40,000 people died. The withdrawal of UN personnel in September 2008 from the 
areas where there was fighting left the population with no international observers present 
and left it exposed to attacks from parties to the conflict. In response to pressure from the 
government and due to lack of expertise, reports of human rights violations and war crimes 
were not reported so that humanitarian access to refugees could be maintained (United 
Nations 2012: 27). Following the publication of the report, a group of experts under the 
leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson worked out the “Human Rights Up 
Front” initiative in order to prevent such a failure from happening again (United Nations 
2013).  
Up to the present the UN presented its action plan, which encompasses at least 60 
individual measures (Kurtz 2015) in a concept paper, a press conference (see under United 
Nations 2013) and in a discussion event in New York20 in September 2014. According to 
UN staff members speaking to the author, the UN Secretariat was for long trying to avoid 
interference by the General Assembly in this reform of the internal organizational culture. 
The Political Section, the Office for Genocide Prevention and the R2P, and, in particular, 
the office of the Secretary-General view “Human Rights up Front” as contributing to the 
implementation of the R2P (see also Ban 2015: para. 56). The increasing incidence of 
human rights violations must be understood as a serious warning of possible conflict and 
potential future atrocities, and the necessity of early diplomatic intervention recognized 
(United Nations 2013). The UN has initiated an internal training program on Human 
Rights and early warning indicators for its staff. Moreover, so-called regional quarterly 
reviews were introduced, where representatives of the UN’s entities for development, 
political questions, humanitarian affairs, and human rights meet to discuss risk situations 
and early warning indicators in specific regions (Kurtz 2015). However, this reform of 
organizational culture has to struggle with several obstacles: rivalry between different UN 
agencies and differences between them when it comes to operational skills in Human Rights 
promotion and monitoring, lack of necessary (and sufficient) resources in the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and skepticism on the side of some member states. 
Last but not least: Big organizations behave in general rather inertly; changes in 
organization culture necessitate a rather long effort to take root (Kurtz 2015). 
6.4  Institutionalization of the first and second pillars 
Initiatives to institutionalize the R2P or parts of R2P are being promoted not only by the 
UN and member countries in the Group of Friends of the R2P but also by civil society 
actors. The R2P Focal Point Initiative was already started in September 2010. Initiated by 
Denmark and Ghana and later supported by Australia and Costa Rica, this aims at 
persuading states to establish national R2P Focal Points. These would coordinate the topics 
of R2P and prevention in their own governments as well as networking among countries 
 
 
20  For video documentation of the event, see: https://youtu.be/8GHptwt_0mU (December 14, 2014). 
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and with the UN Office for Genocide Prevention and the R2P. By August 2015, 50 states 
had nominated such an R2P Focal Point (GCR2P 2015).21  
Because of the continued mistrust of R2P since Libya, norm entrepreneurs are making a 
greater effort to tie the doctrine to regional social and legal norms, which are already 
established, without explicitly making use of the concept of the R2P. An example is the 
Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. This network was 
initiated in March 2012 by a group of government officials from Argentina, Chile, Brazil 
and Panama, who had previously taken part in the genocide prevention courses of the 
Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). The AIPR administratively 
supports the network as its secretariat and, together with the member states, organizes the 
curriculum for further education programs in the areas of capacity building and policy 
development. In addition, it supports member states in developing national prevention 
mechanisms such as the creation of human rights ombudspersons or of interministerial 
commissions for the exchange of relevant information among government agencies. 
Among the members of the network are, with the exception of Cuba, all the Latin American 
states which openly oppose the R2P (AIPR 2015a). 
Based on interviews by the author with diplomats, a reference to genocide and atrocity 
prevention is said to often have better chances of success than a reference to the R2P, and is 
also more appropriate for those states who view R2P as the back door for intervention. For 
this reason, Global Action against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC 2015a) is trying to 
combine the genocide prevention and R2P agendas. In its work, GAAMAC concentrates on 
forging networks among those in national governments who are responsible for atrocity 
prevention. Within the framework of a network with the Genocide Prevention Program of 
George Mason University in the US, Argentina, Switzerland and Tanzania had already 
organized a series of regional forums on prevention of genocide in Argentina (2008), 
Tanzania (2010), Switzerland (2011) and Cambodia (2013) (GAAMAC 2015a). GAAMAC 
emerged from a high-level meeting on prevention of atrocities in March 2013 in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania. It is also supported by three leading countries in the R2P Focal Point 
Initiative (Australia, Costa Rica and Denmark). GAAMAC is a state-led, voluntary, and 
informal consultative network supported by the OSAPG, AIPR, GCR2P, ICRtoP, the FXB 
Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University, the School of Diplomacy and 
International Relations at Seton Hall University, and the Stanley Foundation. It is seeking to 
initiate a movement supported by local, national and regional projects (GAAMAC 2015a). 
States that wish to develop national strategies for atrocity prevention should find support 
through exchange of experiences. Civil-Society organizations are also invited to become 
members. However, apart from an initial meeting in Costa Rica in March 2014, and the 
publication of a GAAMAC-founding document in July 2015, which lines out the aims of 
GAAMAC (GAAMAC 2015b), no results are visible as yet. GAAMAC is planning to 
organize biennial global meetings. Its work is organized by the GAAMAC Steering Group, 
which consists of the aforementioned states, civil society organizations, and academic 
 
 
21  Other initiatives focusing on this topic at the subregional level are found here: www.genprev.net/initiatives/ 
(February 20, 2015). 
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institutions (GAAMAC 2015b: 5–6). Decisions, even though non-binding to the members, 
shall be made by consensus, in order to increase trust and solidarity. 
Ban Ki-moon welcomed these “peer-network” initiatives in 2015 as powerful 
mechanisms to exchange lessons learned and best-practices in the field of atrocity 
prevention (Ban 2015: para. 69). Furthermore, he joined their recommendation for the 
development of concrete national strategies for atrocity prevention. 
The most advanced national institutionalization of and strategy for R2P-related atrocity 
prevention is to be found in the US even if no mention is made of the R2P.22 In 2012 
President Obama created an Atrocity Prevention Board, which consists of senior officials 
from various government agencies. This board is tasked with improving interministerial 
cooperation in the prevention of atrocities, coordinating information and analyzing critical 
situations abroad, as well as developing instruments for prevention and response. In 
addition, the position of Director for War Crimes, Atrocities and Civilian Protection was 
created on the White House National Security Council (Brockmeier et al. 2013). This serves 
as the US R2P Focal Point and organizes the institutional implementation of interagency 
cooperation. As a matter of national interest, the prevention of atrocities has also been 
incorporated into the national security strategy of the US and is discussed in reports to 
Congress by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Department and the Secret 
Service. Together with the Harvard Kennedy School, the military has also developed a 
handbook on conducting mass atrocities response operations. 
There have also been efforts to establish a R2P policy at the European level. At the 
beginning of March 2013 a group of experts, which was convened by the Budapest Centre 
for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities presented a report on 
existing capabilities, as well as suggestions for improvement in the area of prevention of 
mass crime by the European Union (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities 
2013). The experts called on the EU to include the R2P in the European security strategy 
and to declare its support of the R2P in a joint declaration with the European Council, as 
well as in a resolution of the European Parliament. Through an initiative of the Green party, 
the European Parliament had already been discussing parts of this since July 2012. In April 
2013 it called upon the European Council and the Commission to work out an action plan 
for implementing and strengthening the R2P and to create a European R2P Focal Point.23 
Until now, however, this has not produced any results. 
A comparable initiative for a regionally embedded R2P policy has emerged in Southeast 
Asia: A high-ranking panel of experts developed recommendations for embedding the R2P 
in the ASEAN Economic Community which is to come into existence in 2015 (see also 
High-Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia 2014). In 2013 
Adama Dieng, who was seeking ways to promote acceptance of the R2P in Asia, took the 
initiative. Following this, the former ASEAN Secretary-General and former Thai Foreign 
 
 
22  Very little use is made of the concept of the R2P in the discourse, as many people incorrectly assume that 
under the R2P, the US could be obligated to carry out military interventions which are not in the 
country’s interest (Junk 2014). The concept of atrocity prevention is preferred there. 
23  Information on the events in parliament can be found at: http://bit.ly/1hhrsG1 (August 27, 2015). 
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Minister Surin Pitsuwan formed a group of experts. Its report was presented in New York 
on September 9, 2014. Pitsuwan made a deliberate attempt to link the existing regional 
normative order in which he describes the R2P as a contribution to strengthening national 
sovereignty. Drawing attention to existing mechanisms of ASEAN in the human rights 
domain, the authors seek to show ways in which ASEAN can anchor the R2P institutionally 
in order to improve early warning and prevention of atrocities. This is possible without 
fundamentally questioning the non-intervention doctrine of ASEAN. The success of this 
initiative is uncertain. Many states in the region regard their development path as validated 
because economic development under (military) authoritarianism is being given priority, 
whereas democracy and protection of human rights has remained a lower priority for a long 
time. Diplomats from the region also explained to the author that the initiative was 
criticized because the report was produced with the help of the Australian-financed AP-R2P 
(for a critical discussion of R2P NGOs in Asia, see: Capie 2012). 
The reasoning behind these initiatives is to advance the concrete implementation and 
institutionalization of the norm of state responsibility for atrocity prevention parallel to 
declarative commitments, in order to strengthen R2P not just normatively but also 
practically. In the medium term, this may increase the acceptance and application of the 
international response norm: According to the thinking of some initiators, once the 
preventive aspect is embedded, support for international responses to atrocities, including 
coercive means, might also grow due to the resulting socialization into the contents of the 
set of R2P norms. 
7. The R2P set of norms: accepted and yet controversial 
Ten years after the vote in favor of the Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 UN World 
Summit, the set of norms is experiencing low-to-moderate acceptance in the community of 
states while at the same time its individual components remain controversial to varying 
degrees. This is shown by looking at the indicators of norm acceptance summarized here in 
Figure 4 – presence in the discourse, application of the norms and institutionalization. 
Figure 4: Acceptance of R2P in the community of states 
  Degree of acceptance of the norm 
  High Moderate Low None 
Indicators
Salience of the 
norm in the 
discourse 
Pillars 1 and 2  
of R2P are widely 
accepted 
Pillar 3 is widely criticized because 
of procedural misgivings; many 
states only support it with 
reservations 
Many states have not yet stated 
their position on R2P openly  
Application of 
the norm  
Selective application of  
the three pillars of the R2P by  
the Security Council 
No consistent reaction to 
atrocities, but the R2P provides 
the normative framework more 
and more frequently 
 
Change in 
institutions  
Initial national and international 
institutionalization of pillars  
1 and 2 (OSAPG, prevention 
initiatives &  Focal Points) 
Reform initiatives in connection 
with Pillar 3 (RwP, restriction of 
the veto) are receiving support, 
but not being implemented 
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As is clearly shown in the analysis, the controversy in connection with the norms of 
responsibility to protect is mainly concentrated on issues of the correct application and 
implementation of the third pillar. The overall validity of the obligations it contains is not 
openly questioned. All states have acknowledged – at least nominally – that they must 
protect their populations against genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing, and that this is an element of their sovereignty. There is also basic agreement that 
in extreme cases the international community has a responsibility to intervene. However, 
because the threshold for fulfilling this obligation is interpreted differently, the reactive 
component of the R2P has hardly been applied.  
Conflicts over the responsibility to protect often concern the appropriate form of 
responding to atrocities: Developing and emerging nations prefer peaceful instruments of 
response and see dialogue as the best path to conflict resolution. Infringement upon 
national sovereignty is still a hot issue for many states in the global South. Regime changes 
imposed by force, as in Libya in 2011, are not accepted. Many states see this as endangering 
their claim to self-determination, equal development and the formal equality of sovereignty 
in view of the special role of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the 
double standard observable there (Brock/Deitelhoff 2012; Hofmann/Wisotzki 2014: 500–
504). 
As long as initiatives for its further development emerge from the hard-fought conflicts 
over the implementation of its norms, no danger seems to exist of R2P deteriorating to a 
meaningless level. Brazil developed the idea of Responsibility while Protecting and China 
developed the Responsible Protection concept in response to the controversy over NATO 
exceeding its mandate in the Libyan intervention. Both call for greater transparency and 
accountability by those intervening with a UN mandate. In view of the blockade of the 
Security Council in the Syria conflict, various initiatives on restriction of the veto of the five 
permanent Security Council members were revived shortly afterwards. So far, however, 
none of the reforms has been considered. Finally, a few smaller states and civil society 
responded with new prevention initiatives to the intractable stances in the debate on how to 
appropriately respond to serious atrocities. 
However, it could be problematic for the responsibility to protect that a) the reactive 
component is scarcely ever used and, b) some of the prevention initiatives mentioned 
language of genocide and atrocity prevention instead of using the concept of R2P. The latter 
could be a helpful tactic, on one hand, to remove the R2P from the geopolitical conflict of 
interests of the five permanent Security Council members and, on the other, to avoid the 
problem of provoking resistance for the sake of resistance on the part of skeptics. However, 
that could weaken the whole set of norms if the concept of R2P vanished from the discourse 
as a result.  
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8. Prospects for further development of the R2P 
In the area of early warning and concrete implementation of the prevention of atrocities, the 
OSAPG and civil society actors such as ICRtoP, GCR2P and AIPR should continue to be 
supported. Without the support of these actors, most of the initiatives mentioned would no 
longer exist. But they depend on financial support for their work. Financing can run dry 
quickly when there is a change in government in an important supporting country. This 
was demonstrated by Canada rhetorically turning away from the R2P after a conservative 
government took over in 2006: The concept of the R2P is regarded as an unwelcome legacy 
from the previous Liberal government, and Canadian diplomats are not to use the word, 
even if its contents continue to be supported. 
At the same time, the strongest supporters need to live up to their own expectations. 
This involves, for example, establishing an R2P Focal Point, including at the EU level, an 
analysis of relevant capacities in this area and the development of an atrocity prevention 
strategy. Targeted measures aimed at prevention of atrocities should be supported in 
national foreign policy. The US could serve as a frame of reference here (Brockmeier et al. 
2013; Junk 2014). For Germany, the action plan for civilian crisis prevention offers 
important interconnections (Hofmann 2013). The EU can find relevant proposals in the 
report of the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities (2013). Impartial 
evaluation and criticism in assessing situations in which atrocities could occur are also 
necessary. Western liberal democracies must also be prepared to criticize allies for breaking 
humanitarian international law or discriminating against certain groups in their own 
population. This would at least temper the accusation of double standards. 
Prevention is a key focus of R2P. However, it also includes the equally important aspect 
of responding to atrocities. In my opinion, prevention initiatives should be supplemented 
by concrete steps in order to bolster acceptance of the third pillar of the R2P in the 
community of states as well as to strengthen the R2P as a complete set of norms. When R2P 
norm entrepreneurs such as non-governmental organizations and states in the Group of 
Friends of R2P assert that today the R2P is already widely accepted as well as being well on 
the way to becoming customary international law, they incorrectly present as the prevailing 
status quo the desired end-state of norm development (Daase 2013). In this way, however, 
those who view R2P as an imposition of Western value systems on them feel vindicated. 
Supporters must seek constructive dialogue with critics. This is the only way it will be 
possible to establish universal acceptance of the entire set of norms and consistent 
application of the third pillar by the Security Council over time – prerequisites for 
permanent strengthening of the R2P. 
For this reason, there should be an active discussion of the misgivings of many states in 
the south concerning sovereignty in the course of institutional reforms. Non-violent 
measures, such as diplomatic pressure, mediation, observer missions, sanctions or referral 
of a case to the International Criminal Court, are preferable to the application of military 
force (Hofmann 2013: 10-11). If these instruments prove ineffective, any military 
interventions should only be carried out within a narrow scope and under international 
control. For many developing and emerging nations, the non-intervention norm is the 
bedrock of the international order, not simply one qualifiable international law principle 
32 Gregor P. Hofmann 
 
 
among many. In these states, regime change by force in Iraq and Libya stir memories of the 
colonial past when there was no national self-determination or equality in international law. 
The Responsibility while Protecting introduced by Brazil offers a good basis here. Because 
the initiative came from a southern emerging power, it enjoys substantial legitimacy among 
developing countries. Together with Brazil and other emerging nations, such as India and 
South Africa, the concept note should be refashioned into a reform proposal regarding the 
working methods of the Security Council. Through a link to China’s Responsible Protection 
concept, the division in the Security Council on this question might also be overcome. But 
we should not have any illusions: The Security Council will remain the arena for the great 
powers to pursue geopolitical conflicts. For that reason, serious atrocities will occur again 
and again with no reaction from the international community. What is decisive is 
increasing the social pressure on the P5 to accept their responsibility. 
Consequently, as already being discussed in the corridors of the UN, the R2P should be 
officially added to the agenda of the General Assembly. Unlike the open debates of the 
Security Council on the protection of civilians, which often end with negotiations on 
resolutions, the interactive informal dialogues of the General Assembly on the R2P are 
anything but interactive. If the R2P were on the official agenda and concrete proposals for 
resolutions were under discussion, supporters and opponents of the R2P would have to 
participate in a dialogue with each other. After years of informal discussions, a broader 
consensus might be developed. In 2015, a number of states showed interest in putting R2P 
on the official Agenda and proposed a General Assembly resolution to reaffirm the 
international commitment to R2P (GCR2P 2015b). In this way, in view of serious atrocities, 
the pressure on the P5 to agree on a joint approach might increase. 
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize once again that a discursive strengthening of the 
R2P and its components at the international level does not mean any improvement of the 
protection of the people threatened by violence and expulsion. For this, further reforms and 
greater commitment are needed from all countries in the areas of peace building, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as crisis prevention and crisis response, but 
these could not be discussed in this report. Strengthening of the responsibility to protect 
and its acceptance in member states would create the necessary fertile soil for this. However, 
the prerequisite for this is non-selective and coherent implementation of all three pillars of 
R2P as concrete and effective protective measures for populations threatened by atrocities. 
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